.. results in the change of other mental states; then, they impact on the goals and how one pursues them. In Central-State Materialism we have what are known as two strands of the Casual Theory of mind, this is just as so for Functionalism as stated above. Functionalism is the theory that gives meaning to all of the psychological terms. Campbell describes, that we can show how complex mental processes produce sub-elements which are also functional (111). The central nervous system allows us to find mechanisms in the nerve tissues. The sub-units in the process of functional analysis lets us understand how the mechanisms work.
The connection with Materialism to Functionalism is that the mental functions are acted out by the nervous system. In recent years the functional conception of the mind has aided to the enhancement of computer technology. Also we can use Artificial Intelligence, this solves very increased difficult problems. The way a sub-unit processes information is having inputs that change an internal state and outputs that are transformed. In ioing this we recognized this as a functional description.
A functional description is performed for an artificial intelligence, which can relate to natural intelligence. The Casual Theory of the mind was then adopted by Functionalism and had developed into more detail and depth in the mental state known as Functionalism. The Central-State Materialism is in association with the Casual Theory of the mind. Since it is understood because of the different mental states and that the processes were also in different states and along with the central nervous system, this gives the association between Central-State Materialism and our Casual Theory of the mind with Functionalism. But in some instances this is not true because if the right sorts of states and the processes of our central nervous system are not correct we can not have any of these states or processes. Human chauvinism clearly states that only humans with human being internal workings, and only these human beings can perform these ideas: how one thinks, remembers, feels, or solve problems are only consider human beings.
Although saying that we do not acknowledge the intelligence of other beings with minds is inaccurate, for already having the simple knowledge we all know today that another type of being does have similar minds. Remarking that certain animals with relatively similar minds compared to a humans mind is depicting how some human chauvinist think and act toward this idea. Where certain animals like dogs, cats, chimps, and gorillas are said to have minds that operate like us human beings, but might not exactly be comparable to humans because of the internal workings. These other beings behave just as we do humans do and have comparable minds like ours, this shows also in our Casual Theory of mind corresponding to Central-State Materialism that Behaviorism has a connection of mind with our behavior. No matter what you are made of, what counts is the way you do it and what you are doing. We all obtained information from the outside world, be it through our sensations, the way we percept something, or being through different experiences throughout ones life.
All this is stored and used in another way cohesively for the experiences that are to come in the future and they will reflect back to your perception of what happened before. Human chauvinism can be accepted if functional descriptions are satisfactory, and people believe that other beings are like us. Now we can come to realize that there are different relationships between the state of mind and the inner bodily state that is known as a one-one relationship. Campbell considers that, there is a one-many relationship having similar mental states and many different sorts of physical or spiritual stuff and structure involved (117). We can turn to the central nervous system to understand that this relationship can be recognized from its mental state to its physical state. Just as to we revealed this same process in Central-State Materialism we now are conducting it in Funcationalism also.
Under Functionalism we take in the Identity Theory that there is a similar relation of the mind to the brain, which is a logical concept. To go further into our theory from type-type we established the token-token relationship. Because we have thought of a theory as always a material state, it is now to be that an individual case as a mental state, and the other token is said to be a material state. So for any different being that is upset, but no matter what that being is an alien, chimp, or human people we are thought of being constructed differently, but being upset is all in the same state. It would be impossible to evaluate a token-token identification because someone simply does not have time to go through the evidence showing in the instances of the times that someone was upset.
The way we could do this is being more specific with the topic and searching where and why this person became upset. We have also seen Functionalism developed more into detail with the Casual Theory through embodiment and supervenience. ” Functional holds that the essential aspects of any mental description is its account of how input alters an inner element of the organism, and so changes the organisms behavioral output and dispositions to behavior. “(Campbell 119) Here we have something like the organism from the external world, which is acting into and inner structure which is know as the mind. But brain descriptions do not take this form because it relates to how the brain works, what is the brain composed of, and how both of these work to complete the job together. Both of these descriptions have different objectives, and also their characteristics differ as well.
Now the aspect of the mind in psychology which is showing mental functions is impossible to be degraded to some other physiological description, and is describing that psychological knowledge is knowledge of the functions, and physiology deals with their embodiment. A mental supervenient is its embodiment of mental characteristics of Functionalism. Functionalism in the Materialist form is yet the strongest form on Materialism developed. In conclusion, I have shared my opinions on the similarities and differences of both states, first as you read on Central-State Materialism; then, on Functionalism. This has showed me that these to states are yet opposite in one way, but coherent to each other at times and the mind does work in strange ways with our brain, central nervous system, our perception and behavior.
Bibliography 1. Campbell, Keith. “Central-State Materialism,” Body and Mind, 2ND edition. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984, 77-109. 2. Campbell, Keith. “Functionalism,” Body and Mind, 2nd edition.
Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984, 110-123.